The Manifestation of Ethnic Conflict Risk Factors in Côte d'Ivoire and Potential Mitigation Strategies

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Chris Bayer
cbayer@tulane.edu
+ 1 (504) 428 9062
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I. Abstract

Why did Côte d’Ivoire, considered one of the best development prospects in sub-Saharan Africa, slide so quickly into conflict over the past two decades? First, this paper identifies the key drivers of Côte d’Ivoire’s ethno-political struggle – political discrimination along ethnic lines, economic marginalization of entire regions, and the dearth of educational and vocational opportunities for the youth – that have wracked the country since 1993 and then describes how these risk factors led to conflict. The second part of this paper discusses existing and potential initiatives which, in addressing these conflict risk factors, seek to foster peace in Côte d’Ivoire.

II. Introduction

On December 4, 2010 a stand-off ensued over a disputed presidential election between the incumbent Laurent Gbagbo, the other headed by former Prime Minister and IMF Deputy Managing Director Alassane Ouattara. The ensuing political stalemate resulted in a humanitarian crisis and ground West Africa’s second largest economy to a halt. Instances of ethnic cleansing perpetrated by militia groups and armed youth, combined with violent clashes and protester deaths in Abidjan, resulted in approximately 3,000 deaths from mid-December 2010 to mid-April 2011. According to UNHCR, the toll of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) inside the country reached an estimated 1 million people. An estimated 93,000 Ivoirian refugees fled to Liberia.

What are the factors that led to this crisis? To what extent was this conflict delineated along ethnic lines? This paper highlights the main causal factors that stand out in this case and provides recommendations how to redress them going forward.

III. Analytical Framework

The first part of this paper will seek to answer the question how and why Côte d’Ivoire, considered one of the best development prospects in sub-Saharan Africa, slid so quickly into instability over the past two decades. To identify the key drivers of the ethno-political struggle that has wracked the country since 1993, this paper draws on various established theories that associate particular risk factors – ethno-political, economic, and demographic – with ethnic conflict and then describes how these risk factors led to the onset and exacerbation of conflict in case of Côte d’Ivoire. The second part of this paper discusses existing and recommended peace-building efforts, linked to the previously discussed risk factors, which would enhance the prospects for a sustained revival of the country under the new regime.
IV. The Manifestation of Conflict Risk Factors

A. Ethno-political risk factors

Various scholars have investigated the ethnic and political drivers of conflict. Steering away from the greed/grievance dichotomy, Ballentine and Sherman propose an integrated framework of a conflict’s “political economy,” and highlight the prevalence of systematic political and economic exclusion in order to explain the advent of conflict.¹ Frances Stewart purports that civil wars can be caused by group perceptions of “horizontal inequality,” a collective disparity between groups that concerns their relative political participation, economic assets, employment, incomes, and social access and social standing.² Mohammed Ayoob theorizes that the erosion of legitimate authority and lack of capacity for effective governance offer the best explanation for the causes of civil war in developing countries. Furthermore, Ayoob observes that as a weak state is often the cause and consequence of armed conflict, the relationship between state failure and internal conflict is oftentimes cyclical.³ Of Harff and Gurr’s seven-point framework of factors explaining ethno-political violence, the first three focus on the ethnic group actor: degree of group discrimination, strength of group identity, and degree of ethnic cohesion.⁴

i. From a single-party, ethnically-inclusive rule to multi-party, ethnically-partisan politics

When Côte d’Ivoire gained independence in 1960, the ruling Parti démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), under the leadership of Houphouet-Boigny, was the sole political party. The PDCI had broad appeal. Houphouet-Boigny came from two tribes in Ivory Coast, and bridged the country’s main religions: born Animist he converted to Christianity and married a Muslim woman. Trained as a doctor in Senegal, he applied science to farming on his plantation in Côte d’Ivoire and, becoming a successful farmer, was able to present himself as the leader of the Ivoirian peasantry, which at the time comprised the majority of the population. This charismatic leader was thus uniquely placed to forge the many tribes and different religions into a unitary state. Consequently, internal conflict was rare during this tenure.

Houphouet-Boigny extended his inclusive and multi-cultural policies to foreigners, whom he welcomed into the country. Ivoirian citizens and immigrants essentially had the same rights, including the right to vote. In a widely publicized decree of March 20, 1967, the government declared that “la terre appartient à celui qui la met en valeur” (land belongs to the person who renders it productive).⁵ Consequently, immigrants flocked to Côte d’Ivoire and, as the issue of naturalization was not an issue, very few applied for citizenship. In view of supplying the required manpower to boost production

² Ibid
³ Ibid
of the primary economy, bilateral contracts with Burkina Faso welcomed more than 1 million Burkinabe and 500,000 Malians as agricultural workers.\textsuperscript{6} Table 1 below enumerates the number of foreigners and their country of origin living in Côte d’Ivoire in 1988, together accounting for 28% of Côte d'Ivoire’s general population of an estimated 10.6 million.\textsuperscript{7} In sum, these policies allowed for a dynamic multi-ethnic society to evolve.

Table 1: Foreigners living in Côte d’Ivoire according to citizenship –1988\textsuperscript{8}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1,565,085</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>714,165</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>224,886</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>167,145</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>85,092</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>51,663</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>6,078</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other African countries</td>
<td>191,457</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rest of the world</td>
<td>33,429</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,039,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When hundreds of civil servants and students went on strike to protest institutional corruption in 1990, the unrest forced the Houphouet-Boigny government to support multi-party democracy and that year the country’s first pluralist elections were held.\textsuperscript{9} The most notable political opponent was Laurent Gbagbo, founder of the country’s second party, the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI), who however lost the election by a wide margin. The death of Houphouet-Boigny in 1993 resulted in the formation of a new political party, the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR), headed by Djeni Kobinan and later by Alassane Ouattara, which emerged after a scission within the PDCI (then headed by Konan Bédié) effectively divorcing the north from the PDCI.

ii. Identification of – and categorical marginalization against – the ‘Ivoirians from the north’

Categorical discrimination against and exclusion of northern ethnic groups and their political leaders from the political process, culminating in the biased outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 presidential elections, greatly agitated the country’s delicate inter-ethnic dynamics. Upon the death of Côte d’Ivoire’s first president, Félix Houphouet-Boigny, in 1993, Konan Bédié, then National Assembly President, and Alassane Ouattara, then

\textsuperscript{9} \url{http://adesawyerr.wordpress.com/2011/01/25/voting-has-not-solved-the-problem-of-the-ivory-coast-but-military-intervention-may-worsen-it/}
Prime Minister, vied for the presidency, a political tug-of-war which Bédié finally won. Presumably knowing he faced a formidable opponent, Bédié legislated changes to the constitution requiring presidential candidates to have lived in the country for five years and have been born of two Ivoirian parents – a pretext used to prevent Ouattara from running in the 1995 election given his disputed nationality.\(^{10}\)

Furthermore, Bédié introduced the notion of *Ivoirité*, capitalizing on the growing ethnic tension in a context of economic decline and increasing competition for arable land. Striking at the core of a citizen’s identity, *Ivoirité* would distinguish a ‘true’ Ivoirian from an Ivoirian of a ‘mixed’ background. Bédié even went so far as to form an intellectual group, *the Cellule universitaire de réflexion et de diffusion des idées du président Bédié* (CURDIPHE), to further expand on the notion. It did not stop there:

> *Intellectuals, who belong to the Akan group, took up the notion of Ivoirité and tried to elaborate on it. Influential political leaders began to talk about ‘Ivoirians from the south’ (i.e. Akan people [42.1% of the total population]), ‘Ivoirians from the north’ (i.e. ‘Moslem Diula [34.1%]) and ‘Ivoirians from the West’ (i.e. Bété group [11%]). For the public, such a simplistic classification is attractive. The former ruling PDCI is considered the “party of the Akan people” to which its Baule leaders belong; the Ivoirian Popular Front (FPI) of the new president Gbagbo is said to be the “party of the Bété” and the RDR the “party of Dyula Moslems.” The latter, to which the Senufo group belongs, are labelled “the Northerners” and considered second-class citizens. They are “uncivilized” and “underdeveloped.” In the public discourse of people who define themselves as Akan, “the northerners” are not “true” Ivoirians, they are Ivoirians “by chance.”*\(^{11}\)

Thus, in preaching the concept of *Ivoirité*, Bédié deliberately aggravated sentiments of resentment on the part of southern autochthon tribes, ethnicities who were apprehensive that “over the decades since independence, migrants – particularly northerners and immigrants from poorer, arid Sahelian countries – have [become] the majority in many southern areas, particularly in the southwestern cocoa belt,” some settling as cocoa and coffee farmers, others as traders.\(^{12}\) By casting an “us” vs. “them”

\(^{10}\) Ouattara’s nationality has been a controversial issue in Côte d’Ivoire. In order to be eligible for the 2000 elections, Ouattara submitted documents which demonstrated that he and his parents were of Ivoirian birth. He himself was reportedly born in Dimbokro, Côte d’Ivoire, on January 1, 1942 and he holds an Ivoirian nationality certificate (for Ouattara’s biography, see the IMF’s profile “Alassane D. Ouattara.” [http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/bios/ado.htm](http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/bios/ado.htm)). Opponents, notably Bédié, point to his father’s family roots in Burkina Faso. According to Bédié, Mr. Ouattara reportedly attended the University of Philadelphia as a citizen of Burkina Faso and as far back as 1983, countries in the UEMOA nominated him for the position of President of their Central Bank on the basis of his Burkinabe citizenship (Nyinah, Joe, "I didn’t anticipate actions could lead to coup." 30 December 1999. Graphic. [http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=92662](http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=92662)). The politicization of this issue climaxed when under Bédié’s watch he was accused of forging his parent’s Ivoirian birth papers, his nationality certificate was annulled by a court in October 1999 and an arrest warrant for Ouattara was issued a month later (Wikipedia. Rally of the Republicans. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rally_of_the_Republicans](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rally_of_the_Republicans)).


paradigm, Bédié ostracized the northerners and played to southern ethnicities’ xenophobic angst. Mobilizing fear into fervor, and excluding the RDR,\textsuperscript{13} one of the country’s three principal parties, he won the 1995 election. However, in delineating three distinct groups of Ivoirians, Bédié had motivated the factions to band more tightly together.

iii. The coup that ended democratic rule and perpetuated ethnic marginalization

The country’s first ever military coup in 1999 undermined the still nascent esteem Ivoirians had for the principles of democracy since the democratic opening in 1990, setting a bad precedent. Ouattara was again excluded in the 2000 presidential election. At the behest of junta leader General Guei, the leader of the RDR party, Alassane Ouattara, was disqualified by the country's Supreme Court due to his alleged Burkinabé nationality.\textsuperscript{14} Since each of the three major political parties in Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI, RDR, FPI) was identified with the ethnic group of its leader,\textsuperscript{15} Ouattara’s supporters interpreted this move as blatant ethnic discrimination and consequently violent demonstrations were staged in Yamoussoukro.

iv. Ethnic cohesion to effect ethnic division

Ever since the 1993 election, representatives of the two major ethnic groups in the north – the Northern Mandé and Senoufos – accused the southern Baoulé-dominated government of discriminating against northern Muslims and those of foreign origin.\textsuperscript{16} Thus, grieved by their perceived subjection to systemic inequalities, the “Ivoirians of the North” comprising roughly 30% of the Ivorian population, had come to the conclusion that they had more to gain than lose from a rebellion. Concerted inter-ethnic collaboration in the north was needed and effected to this end.

The defining moment in Côte d'Ivoire’s history was the onset of civil war in September 2002 which split the country in two. Northern Ivoirian dissidents and disaffected members of the military launched a coup attempt against President Gbagbo in September 2002 while he was out of the country, simultaneously attacking targets in three cities of the country. While the coup failed, the militants quickly entrenched themselves in the northern half of the country (see Figure 1 below).

\textsuperscript{13} The Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) party was formed after the death of Félix Houphouet-Boigny in 1993 and was supported by the country’s northern ethnicities.

\textsuperscript{14} Wikipedia. Côte d'Ivoire. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C%C3%B4te_d'Ivoire

\textsuperscript{15} Gbagbo is Bété, Ouattara is Dioula, and Bédié is Baoulé

A détente was reached in late January 2003 when the country's major political parties (including the Force Nouvelle) signed the French-brokered Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accord, agreeing to a power-sharing government that included Force Nouvelle representatives in ministerial positions. The parties also agreed to work together on issues of national identity, eligibility for citizenship, and land tenure laws, which many observers saw as among the root causes of the conflict. In March 2007 President Gbagbo and Force Nouvelle rebel leader Guillaume Soro signed the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA), a roadmap for the country’s emergence from its political crisis. As a result of the agreement, Soro joined Gbagbo’s government as Prime Minister and the two agreed to reunite the country by retracting their respective armies and integrating rebel forces into the national armed forces, as well as hold elections.

While many of the agreements in the Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accord and the OPA did not eventuate, after much political wrangling over citizen identification and voter registration, and after 6 postponements, presidential elections did come to pass on the 28th of November 2010. The country’s September 2002 split between the north and the south evidenced itself once again in the 2010 elections. Figure 2 below depicts the aggregated election results by region, with the dark orange and orange regions that voted for Ouattara, and the blue and dark blue region that voted in favor of Gbagbo.

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17 Ibid
v. The will of the incumbent vs. the will of the people

In the absence however of strong state institutions and respect for election procedures, the 2010 election furthermore presented a conflict risk factor in that it would quite possibly upset the guarded political status quo. Not only were the preconditions of the elections – e.g. ID cards, voter lists – contentious issues which led to the repeated postponement of the elections, attempts were made to undermine the process in spite of the UN’s substantial support to – and supervision of – the Commission Electorale Indépendante (CEI) of Côte d’Ivoire, which officially implemented the elections.

An overt example of sabotage occurred on December 1, when a Gbagbo-nominated CEI member, Damana Adia Pickass, seized and tore up the provisional CEI results on live television just as the CEI spokesman, Bamba Yacouba, was about to publicly announce Ouattara as the provisional winner. Blatant acts undermining the voting

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21 The incident disrupted the workings of the IEC and reportedly caused it to miss its legal deadline for announcing the results, creating the pretext for the constitutional council review.
process only further polarized the public, aggravated tension and eroded public confidence in the process.

The non-recognition of the election results by Gbagbo and his camp was a blatant disregard for the democratic process and outcome. Under the guise of constitutionalism, on December 4 Gbagbo proceeded with a swearing-in ceremony for another five-year presidential term, in spite of the fact that the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General for Côte d’Ivoire, Choi Young-Jin had certified the outcome based on an independent tally process carried out entirely separately but in parallel to that undertaken by the CEI. Also on December 4, Ouattara was sworn in as President in a separate ceremony, resulting in two rival governments, both laying claim to legitimate power. As the political crisis was not resolved, both sides placed their faith in their armed supporters, counting on the will and resolve of the “armed people” to be manifested.

B. Economic risk factors

Collier and Hoeffler econometrically investigate the determinants of intrastate conflict, and in devising the greed/grievance model find that financial motivations play a large role in the emergence of a rebellion. Their model furthermore confirms that developing countries with abundant natural resources have a higher risk of conflict up to a certain point – in particular states with a high dependence on primary commodity exports. The authors emphasize in their analysis the importance of the sources of finance in a civil war, especially income derived from “natural resource predation” and a “large diaspora abroad.” Further increasing the risk of civil war is the “chronic diversion of state economic resources through patronage networks” leading to the creation of a ‘shadow state.’ Although at the face of it a civil war plunges a country into a state of anarchy, a “civil war economy” is better understood as having the potential to create “an alternate system of profit, power and protection.” In that sense, Carl von Clausewitz’s dictum can be rephrased to state: “war is the continuation of [economics] by other means.”


Also relevant is David Keen’s war utility paradigm, which explains war as a system that has significant functions and that yields interconnected economic, political and psychological benefits to its perpetrators.27

i. The profit motive and cui bono

Prior to its descent into civil war in 2002, Côte d’Ivoire was a weak state. A reliance on the export of primary goods, pervasive unemployment and under-employment, a sizable national debt, a market liberalized by the World Bank since 1999, and endemic corruption together resulted in an overall feeble and declining economy. While economic decline does not categorically predict the onset of intrastate conflict, it may be symptomatic of state-level mismanagement. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, the emergence of first one southern network of diversion and predation of state resources, which provided grounds for the onset of the civil war, in turn lead to a northern network of resource predation.

During President Gbagbo’s additional five years beyond his 2005 term limit, his income was diverse. Revenue from the oil sector, estimated at USD 1 billion per year, was not included in the official government budget. Some of these proceeds made up the Ivorian presidency’s "sovereignty budget" – discretionary spending reportedly worth USD 80 million in 2006.28 Corruption allegations against the Gbagbo regime proliferated such as a Hummer vehicle given by a San Pedro-based Lebanese businessman to Gbagbo’s daughter. In May 2011, authorities in Switzerland froze assets worth USD 81 million linked to the former president.29 An investigation into his alleged embezzlement is underway. One such finding may be that the country’s primary fertilizer company personally profited Gbagbo. Not surprisingly, Gbagbo had no intention of relinquishing the presidency, regardless of the vote count, even publically stating “we win or we win.”30

The civil war was not only profitable for Gbagbo, the Force Nouvelle rebellion took control of 60% of the country’s territory that notably yielded cotton, cocoa and diamonds, trade of which supported the rebellion’s existence often at the expense of the local population.31 Ten regional commanders, or Comzones, controlled the natural resources in their respective domains. Comzones such as Fofié and Koné Zachariah of Vavoua personally controlled payments from traders and truckers. “Fofié’s control over a major town and key trade routes means he [had] much opportunity for amassing wealth, while Zachariah control[ed] the main rebel-held cocoa-producing areas and

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30 Whether or not the northern population was actually better off during the 8-year occupation of the Force Nouvelle is debatable, especially in light of the considerable humanitarian and social interventions launched by the international community to counteract deteriorating humanitarian conditions in the rebel-held areas.
diamond mines." However, this fiefdom system was progressively regulated by "La Centrale," the tax and customs organization of the rebel administration controlled by rebel leader Guillaume Soro. Thus, the rebellion was not only able to self-finance, it was quite literally a gold mine for those at the top of the hierarchy.

Cocoa for example was routed north through Bobo-Dioulasso, Burkina Faso, where it was often sorted, before being trucked to Togo and loaded onto ships. A typical Force Nouvelle-originating cocoa supply chain went like this: farmer -> *pisteur* (trucker) -> Lebanese warehouse owner -> international commodity broker -> Lomé (Togo) -> Amsterdam (The Netherlands) -> chocolate manufacturer. Unscrupulous middle men were needed along the way to investigate bean quality, make purchases, and obscure the Chain-of-Custody documentation, including obtaining “certificates" for cocoa beans of Togolese origin. Money laundering was also rampant, e.g. Prime Minister Soro sending a German commodity broker based in Bobo-Dioulasso two suit-cases full of cash, and instructed him to buy a certain amount of cocoa and transfer the proceeds into a Swiss bank account.

In short, the perception of undo southern profit from national resources was a factor prompting the civil war and resource predation was practiced during the civil war by both parties. While the civil war was arguably detrimental to the country’s economy, it was highly profitable for the agents of the conflict, such as the President, warlords and soldiers, as well as unscrupulous businessmen.

**C. Demographic risk factors**

Certain demographic characteristics are associated with the risk of intrastate conflict, especially when they interact with each other and with non-demographic factors, compounding net risk for a conflict event. The “youth bulge," a term coined by German social scientist Gunnar Heinsohn in the mid-1990s, is a theory which contends that countries with rapidly growing young populations often end up with rampant unemployment and large pools of disaffected youths who are more susceptible to recruitment into armed conflict. In fact, many developing countries which are experiencing a youth-bulge have youth unemployment rates three to five times that of adults. Unemployment has very real repercussions for working-age youth: it prolongs dependency on parents, diminishes self-esteem and fuels frustrations. Collier and Hoeffler also found that high unemployment and non-attendance of secondary school

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33 Ibid.


35 According to Richard Cincotta, consultant to the National Intelligence Council’s Long Range Analysis Unit
act as catalysts for intrastate conflict as the opportunity cost for potential rebels is low and thus makes recruitment easier.\textsuperscript{36}

A youth bulge is particularly pronounced when a country undergoes a demographic transition, moving from high to low mortality and fertility, which, as political scientists Gary Fuller and Jack A. Goldstone argue, renders such a country especially vulnerable to civil conflict. Empirically, the theory holds: “countries with more than 40 percent of young adults (aged 15 to 29 years) in the population of adults (aged 15 and older) were 2.3 times as likely to experience an outbreak of civil conflict as countries with smaller proportions during the 1990s.”\textsuperscript{37}

\textbf{i. The youth bulge and its mobilization}

Côte d’Ivoire’s population pyramid is featured in Figure 3 below, with those aged 15-29 years marked in orange, a substantial segment of the population. Its distinct youth bulge is illustrated in Figure 4, where the population wave of 0 to 14 year olds cresting in 1984, is presently coming of age. Comparing Figure 5 and Figure 6, one observes that the death rate dropped before the birth rate over the period, suggesting a demographic transition is well underway. Moreover, one could make the argument that Côte d’Ivoire is undergoing a protracted demographic transition, in which the shift from high to low mortality and fertility rates is drawn out. As of 2008, the country’s fertility rate was 4.6, while a replacement rate is 2.1, which means that a demographic transition in the country still has a ways to go.


Figure 3: Côte d’Ivoire – Population Pyramid: 2010

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

Figure 4: Côte d’Ivoire – Population Ages 0 - 14 (% of total)


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38 U.S. Census Bureau. International Data Base.  
http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/country.php
To contextualize the youth bulge theory in the case of Côte d'Ivoire, in the systemic absence of educational and employment opportunities, a disenfranchised and mobilized youth on each side of the conflict greatly contributed to its exacerbation. When the country devolved into civil war in 2002, youths in the north armed themselves with any weapon they could get their hands on and joined the rebel movement. These youths e.g. manned road checkpoints and were absorbed into an armed movement, that according to Prime Minister Soro, was transforming itself into a force that was "responsible, credible and capable of managing the affairs of state."39 Although arguably inflated, according to the national disarmament commission and the terms of a series of disarmament deals signed in 2005, the rebels numbered 42,564 troops – a sizable

group. While official unemployment figures are not available, as a result of the civil war Côte d’Ivoire’s unemployment rate may have climbed to 50%.

The Young Patriots emerged within the Gbagbo camp, young ultranationalist who claimed to be “struggling for the country’s ‘second independence’ from the former colonial power, France. Many of them conceive of their struggle not just as a political one but as a search for social affirmation.” Young Patriots, “often armed with machetes, clubs or guns, set up roadblocks all over the main city in Abidjan after a call by [Young Patriot] leader Blé Goudé to hunt pro-Ouattara rebels and obstruct U.N. staff, whom he accuses of backing them.” In coordination with state security forces, many of its members were given weapons before the April 2011 apex of the conflict, a youth militia which in turn waged house-to-house ethnic cleansing campaigns killing and terrorizing countless civilians. Young Patriot demagogue Charles Blé Goudé now stands accused of inciting ethnic violence and xenophobia, and is now subject to an international arrest warrant issued by Côte d’Ivoire.

These are but two relatively recent examples of Côte d’Ivoire’s youth being embroiled in the civil conflict. Yet there are many more instances in the country’s history where the youth demonstrated en masse or undertook mob-like action, placing their own lives and the lives of others at risk. The youth were for example instrumental in overthrowing General Guei and bringing Gbagbo to power in 2000, or carrying out vengeful crimes against the in-country French in 2004. In short, Ivorian politicians used the youth – desperate in their search for meaning and self-actualization – as a political base and mobilized them as agents of street action, resulting in the stoking – not calming – of ethnic tension.

V. Peace-building Efforts in Côte d’Ivoire and Recommendations

The following section describes existing and potential initiatives in the domain of security and order, transitional justice and social reconciliation, broad-based political participation, and economic development, which, in addressing previously discussed conflict risk factors, act to foster peace in the country.

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43 UNHRC. Report of the High Commissioner.
A. Security and order

Reestablishing security and order after the denouement of hostilities in April 2011 became the new regime's first order of business. Close collaboration between the domestic security forces and the UN and Force Licorne security forces is the order of the day. As of the 31st of March 2011, the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) had a total of 9,077 total uniformed personnel and the well-equipped French Force Licorne has roughly 2,000 men in the country. Measures have been taken to ensure that the tenuous security situation is maintained and that the position of the democratically elected president is protected from threats to unseat him. Only when the in-country conditions are stable and the state has the capacity to ensure order would a pullout of foreign forces be advisable. Simultaneously, as the foreign presence is regarded by many as a neo-colonial intervention, the UN and the French forces walk the fine line of maintaining peace but also not interfering with the internal affairs of state.

Restructuring the national army is furthermore high on the agenda. However, integration of the Force Nouvelle militia with Gbagbo's more professionally-run military into a new national army will not come without its challenges. Many Force Nouvelle combatants lack education and formal military training. Sending a clear signal and in a show of appreciation, Ouattara appointed ex-rebel commander Bakayoko as army head. Yet other leadership positions have been given to Gbagbo's army command that defected during the battle for Abidjan, including Firmin Detoh Letoh, who is now deputy chief of staff. In a bid to formalize security service, the new government plans to introduce biometric ID for all security personnel. For all rebel and Young Patriots fighters not prepared or found suitable for military service, a nation-wide disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program must be carried out to thwart further instability, preventing militia violence or informal roadblocks.

B. Transitional justice and social reconciliation

Another immediate priority for the Ouattara government is to achieve transitional justice and social reconciliation in the form of a South Africa – styled Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TFC). On July 20, 2011, President Alassane Ouattara signed into law

46 comprised of 7,594 troops, 187 military observers, 1,296 police, 402 international civilian personnel, and 743 local staff and 256 United Nations Volunteers
48 Ibid
such a commission to investigate Ivory Coast's post-election violence in which an estimated 3,000 people were killed and one million displaced. The TRC, he said, would document massacres, crimes, and other human rights violations by all parties arising from the crisis, along with abuses during the 1990s. The council of ministers overseeing the commission stated that it would "help understand how and why people were able to conceive, plan and execute such grave violations of human rights."

Stating that “reconciliation cannot happen without justice,” Ouattara also announced that Gbagbo and one of his two wives, Simone, would, along with a number of supporters, be subjected to a judicial investigation by the Minister of Justice and face charges “at a ‘national level and an international level’.” On April 16, the Justice Minister stated that such probes would focus on “crimes of blood,” arms purchases, or embezzlement by former Gbagbo regime leaders. Indeed Gbagbo’s son, Michel Gbagbo, has been charged – alongside 37 other close allies of his father – with taking part in an armed insurrection and attempting to undermine the state which killed an estimated 3,000 people. International arrest warrants have been issued for those who have fled overseas.

While Ouattara has insisted that those on both sides of the political divide would face justice if they committed crimes during the five-month dispute, so far none of his supporters have been arrested or charged, even though Ouattara’s Justice Minister, Jeannot Ahoussou, admitted that pro-Ouattara forces were responsible for a limited share of 536 or more of the killings documented in western Côte d'Ivoire in March and April 2011. The extent to which the Ouattara regime is even-handed in its pursuit of justice will determine in large part how representative and legitimate his regime will be regarded.

Concern over human rights crimes committed in Côte d'Ivoire is also evident at the international level. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, is currently collecting evidence and testimonies that would lend support to his request for a formal ICC investigation into crimes committed during months of violence.

While it is clear that Ouattara cannot let serious crimes go unpunished, he however faces a trade-off of either pursuing (impartial) justice at all costs or hastening reconciliation through clemency and pardon. Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga – who for many years struggled for Luo political representation in a Kikuyu dominated government – served as the African Union mediator between the rival presidents. His stated view is that the “civil war will not end” unless reconciliation takes place.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14231257
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=13384653
55 BBC. Ivory Coast conflict: Laurent Gbagbo’s son charged. 10 August 10, 2011  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14477842
Integral to that end is that Gbagbo be pardoned. “If we want to reconcile, give Gbagbo a safe exit.” While this outcome would be desirable in that Gbagbo and his followers would no longer be maligned by the current regime and reconciliation could be hastened, the danger with that option is the precedent it would set: immunity for the big man. The individual who not only stood in the way of a peaceful transition of power, but thereafter used his executive powers in order to manipulate and subvert the state, walks. On the other hand, an election outcome is an election outcome. Incumbent presidential candidates must learn to respect the election outcome or suffer the consequences. Yet even if a safe exit was granted, it would not guarantee Gbagbo’s non-interference in the country’s politics. Indeed, during his voluntary exile in France from 1992 to 1998, Gbagbo continued to organize the FPI from abroad, and as his socialist-leaning activities were causing a stir also in France, Jacques Chirac pressured Gbagbo to return to his home country.

C. Broad-based political participation

During the post-election stand-off, Ouattara extend Gbagbo the option of a unity government, however, one in which he would assume the presidency. This offer was rejected by Gbagbo. On the 1st of June, 2011, Ouattara announced the formation of his government: fourteen members are drawn from his RDR party, eight from the PDCI of his main ally, former president Henri Konan Bedie, the Force Nouvelle has five members in the cabinet, while five ministers are drawn from civil society. The remaining 4 positions are held by smaller parties, with Gbagbo’s FPI party absent. This array of appointments speaks to the broad, inclusionary vision of Ouattara.

The question is: did Ouattara go far enough reaching out across the country’s deep ethnic, religious and political divide? 45.9% after all – almost half of the population – voted for Gbagbo. The broader the inclusion of political perspectives – the less ground there is for grievance and resentment to foster animosities in a country having experienced 10 years of division, conflict and violence. Part of the solution, according to Raila Odinga, is that is to “get some of [Gbagbo’s] people because he represents a number of people and also a big region in the country. Get those people in the government so you play a game of inclusivity.” Indeed, there is a mayor lesson to be learned from Côte d’Ivoire’s recent history: even if it is within your power to exclude a political opposition from the political process, doing so repeatedly will stoke grievances that could come back to haunt you, your party and country. Broad-based political participation – including political representation of ethnic minorities – may not only contribute to the defusing of ethnic tensions, in the long-term it may stimulate confidence in political institutions and the emergence of a tolerant political culture. No

party should therefore be excluded from the political process or presidential elections. Above all, affirmative measures must be taken to avoid a cyclical dynamic whereby one ethnic groups’ privileged relationship to power results in the subjugation of another (set of) ethnic groups, a power struggle which may eventually be reverted, perpetuating a vicious spiral of strife and bloodshed.

At the heart of the question of political participation is the issue of Ivorian citizenship. While the politics of the country’s first president were based on ethnic inclusion, he did not institutionalize his multi-cultural politics in the form of land tenure, citizenship, and immigrant law. Bédié’s and Gbagbo’s exclusionary politics stress the relationship between various ethnic groups, and neither effectively dealt with the core issues they inherited. As people originating from foreign countries still make up a significant part of the overall population, now roughly 20%, ethnic competition and tension will not dissipate in the country until these central issues are officially and judiciously addressed through progressive reform.

D. Economic development

The country’s ability to regenerate and overcome its demographic and economic risk factors largely depends on the government’s ability to create enabling conditions for job creation and the growth of the economy. Côte d'Ivoire’s impressive growth from 1960 – 1980 may in large part be attributed to Houphouet-Boigny’s rigorous focus on the primary economy: maximizing the output of agricultural production through the import of labor and foreign direct investment. Today, the focus must return to the primary economy and the addition of value to the primary goods, given that roughly half of the population lives in the rural areas and the economy depends on the export of cash crops. Today, labor being in plentiful supply, big issues include land ownership, agricultural extension services, and food security. Land reform, if carried out in a fair and orderly fashion, would address xenophobia and help defuse Ivorité. 3-year agriculture-centered vocational schools that reaches out to children who don’t attend secondary school – such as the Ecoles Familiales Agricoles (Family Field Schools) offered by the Plate Forme de Ecoles Familiales Agricoles de Côte d'Ivoire61 – is one way to not only redress a stagnating agricultural sector but also counteract demographic stress factors such as the country’s youth bulge. Drumming up FDI remains a challenge as investor confidence in the country is low – the government has repeatedly defaulted on its loans. Establishing a new Caisse the Stabilization to regulate the cocoa sector as promised during his election campaign is also in order, using a 5-year revenue averaging horizon which would best adapted to cocoa’s supply and demand cycles. Nation-wide investments in infrastructure would furthermore stimulate job creation – the country’s roads are in a deplorable state or non-existent in the underserved rural areas. In addition, the country’s top-heavy bureaucracy must be reformed, along with its entrepreneur-stifling taxation regime.

From 2002 to 2011, the divided state enabled principally two opposing networks of political, business, and military elites to exploit ethnic politics and perpetuate violence.

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and instability for their own financial gains. In order to break with its past, the state’s function is enhanced and fiscal mismanagement is reduced when measures are taken that lower monopoly and discretionary power of state agents and improve accountability.\textsuperscript{62} Fiscal transparency over all sources and expenditure of state revenue would not only allow the government to better manage finite resources and instill confidence in the new regime, it would also link elite prosperity to peace and unity rather than violence and division.\textsuperscript{63} As a first step, Ouattara recently made each member of his cabinet publically sign a code of ethics.\textsuperscript{64}

Yet economic development must also be accompanied by a concerted focus on reproductive health and family planning: only so with the protracted demographic transition come to an end. Total fertility rate (TFR) fell from 6.7 births per woman in 1980 to 5.2 in 1998 and to 4.6 in 2008.\textsuperscript{65} Such an effort would not only control the youth bulge in the long term, it would also allow social services and infrastructure to catch up to existing population demands.

VI. Conclusion

Systemic marginalization of the northern ethnic groups, culminating in the repeated denial of the chance for their leader, Ouattara, to run for presidential office, resulted in the northerner’s view of an illegitimate “southern” government. Bédié’s polarizing \textit{Ivoirité} discourse only deepened ethnic divisions and resentment.

In 2002 the confluence of risk factors culminated in a critical mass of tension and opposing interests, spilling over into civil war. At the onset of and throughout the conflict, political leaders “leveraged” the country’s considerable youth bulge for their respective political aims, using impressionable, energetic and disenfranchised youth for rebel or street action, further exacerbating the conflict. While the civil war was arguably detrimental to the country’s economy, it was highly profitable for the agents on both sides of the conflict, the conflict itself used to justify their respective claims to authority.

The prospect of long-term, nation-wide peace and reconciliation since the April 2011 denouement is only achievable if the risk factors – political discrimination along ethnic lines and economic marginalization of entire regions, and the dearth of educational and vocational opportunities for the youth – are effectively addressed. Reform in the areas of citizenship and land rights is fundamental to this process. In the short term, the Ouattara government faces the critical tradeoff of seeking justice while promoting reconciliation. Importantly, Ouattara must be careful not to allow the politics and policies of discrimination, that he fought for so long, now to be imposed on Gbagbo’s


\textsuperscript{64} Reuters. Ouattara makes I.Coast cabinet sign anti-graft pledge. Aug 10, 2011. \url{http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE77901I20110810}

constituency, inversing the structural inequalities and cause for grievance. Although tension hangs thick in the air, Ouattara has launched promising initiatives towards transitional justice and social reconciliation, inclusive political participation and economic development. Wise leadership is needed now more than ever to mend the deep ethnic wounds and set the country back on track.